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The chronic difficulty in achieving a cogent separation of capital
gains from ordinary income' has been particularly severe in two areas:
(1) cases necessitating classification of payments received for termina-
tion of contract rights; 2 (2) cases involving distinction between ordinary
business and "other" (for example, investment) receipts for the pur-
poses of section 1221(1) of the Internal Revenue Code .3 These areas
present issues that are left unsettled both by current statute4 and by
legislative intent.5 This Note will criticize existing judicial doctrines
* For critical guidance and encouragement, the author is deeply indebted to Boris
Bittker, Robert C. Clark, and Bernard NVolfman. Partial support for this research was
obtained from NSF Grants GS-2689, SOC76-24512, and SOC76-24394, as well as MCS75-
01493A01.
1. Chirelstein has put it succinctly: "In fact, as everyone knows, the elements of un-
certainty surrounding the scope of the preference [for capital gains] have shown a tendency
to multiply rather than dwindle with the passage of time." Chirelstein, Capital Gain and
the Sale of a Business Opportunity: The Income Tax Treatment of Contract Termination
Payments, 49 MINN. L. REv. 1, 2 (1964). See B. Bin-ER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE
AND GIFT TAXATION 500 (4th ed. 1972); Miller, The "Capital Asset" Concept: A Critique of
Capital Gains Taxation (pt. 1), 59 YALE L.J. 837 (1950); Surrey, Definitional Problems in
Capital Gains Taxation, 69 HARV. L. REv. 985 (1956).
2. See [1977] 4 FED. TAXES (P-H) f 32,117 (listing cases pertaining to termination of
contract rights). The complexity of the termination payments area is well illustrated by 60
MICn. L. REv. 235 (1961).
3. See [1977] 4 FED. TAXES (P-H) ffff 32,071-76 (listing cases covering tax definition of
stock in trade, inventories, and property held for sale to customers). See also id. f111 32,358-
70 (commodity futures and hedging transactions).
4. I.R.C. §§ 1201-1254.
5. For the history and legislative background of the capital gains system as introduced
in the Revenue Act of 1921, see H.R. RE'. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 10-11
(1921); Thulin, The Capital Transaction Under the Revenue Act of 1921, 17 ILL. L. Rv.
489 (1923). Miller, The "Capital Asset" Concept: A Critique of Capital Gains Taxation (pt.
2), 59 YALE L.J. 1057, 1057 n.1 (1950), appropriately describes the original Committee Re-
port as "elliptical." For the subsequent statutory evolution, see 1939-I C.B. (pt. 2) 168, 176;
Wells, Legislative History of Treatment of Capital Gains Under the Federal Income Tax,
1913-1948, 2 NAT'L TAX J. 12 (1949).
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that have been developed to govern the two lines of cases and will
propose a single standard for both. The proposed standard is a me-
chanical one and relies on a mathematical measure that is calibrated to
extend favored capital gains treatment to holders of long-term invest-
ments, that is, investments giving a gradual stream of returns over
several years. This standard, which derives from an economic analysis
of the lock-in problem, should be capable of solving most of the refrac-
tory classification problems that have historically plagued the two
areas."
I. Critique of the Traditional Judicial Doctrines
Under the general rules of the present Code,7 disposition of an asset
qualifies for long-term capital gain (and thus substantially reduced
taxation) if three criteria are met: (1) the asset is a capital asset under
section 1221;8 and (2) the disposition qualifies as a "sale or exchange"
6. The Note will not explore the various alternatives to the existing structure of
capital gains treatment that are now under consideration. See M. DAVID, ALTERNATIVE
APPROACHES TO CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION 109-15 (1968) (classification of reform strategies);
S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFoRM (1973) (capital gains reform placed in broader re-
form context); J. Green 8- E. Sheshinski, Optimal Capital Gains Taxation Under Limited
Information (Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford Uni-
versity, Aug. 1977).
7. I.R.C. §§ 1221-1223.
8. The current text of I.R.C. § 1221 is as follows:
For purposes of this subtitle, the term "capital asset" means property held by the
taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade or business), but does not include-
(1) stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would prop-
erly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the
taxable year, or property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in
the ordinary course of his trade or business;
(2) property, used in his trade or business, of a character which is subject to the
allowance for depreciation provided in section 167, or real property used in his trade
or business;
(3) a copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition, a letter or memo-
randum, or similar property, held by-
(A) a taxpayer whose personal efforts created such property,
(B) in the case of a letter, memorandum, or similar property, a taxpayer for
whom such property was prepared or produced, or
(C) a taxpayer in whose hands the basis of such property is determined, for
purposes of determining gain from a sale or exchange, in whole or part by refer-
ence to the basis of such property in the hands of a taxpayer described in sub-
paragraph (A) or (B);
(4) accounts or notes receivable acquired in the ordinary course of trade or
business for services rendered or from the sale of property described in paragraph
(1);
(5) an obligation of the United States or any of its possessions, or of a State or
any political subdivision thereof, or of the District of Columbia, issued on or after
March 1, 1941, on a discount basis and payable without interest at a fixed matu-
rity date not exceeding one year from the date of issue; or
(6) a publication of the United States Government (including the Congressional
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under section 1222; 9 and (3) the asset has been held longer than the
statutory holding period under sections 1222 and 1223.10 Although each
of these requirements may present ambiguities in application, 1 the
most basic difficulties are those surrounding the uncertain scope of the
capital asset concept itself, and specifically the embodiment of that
concept in the language of section 1221.12 For example, section 1221
provides no guidance for determining the capital asset status of lump-
sum payments for termination of contract rights. 13 Also notable for its
ambiguity is the classification into "business assets" (creating ordinary
income) and "non-business assets" (creating capital gain) that is im-
plied by the "sale to customers in the ordinary course of [a taxpayer's]
trade or business" language of section 1221(1). The legislative history
here supports the intention to establish some sort of division between
"ordinary business receipts" taxable as ordinary income and "income
from disposition of investments" taxable as capital gains, but the
standard governing the division is far from specific. 14
To attack these and similar problems,1 a variety of judicial standards
has been devised to supplement the explicit coverage of section 1221.
These standards are by no means all consistent with each other and can
frequently be limited to very specific facts. Within the maze of par-
Record) which is received from the United States Government or any agency thereof,
other than by purchase at the price at which it is offered for sale to the public, and
which is held by-
(A) a taxpayer who so received such publication, or
(B) a taxpayer in whose hands the basis of such publication is determined, for
purposes of determining gain from a sale or exchange, in whole or in part by ref-
erence to the basis of such publication in the hands of a taxpayer described in
subparagraph (A).
9. I.R.C. § 1222(3) provides: "The term 'long-term capital gain' means gain from the
sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than one year if and to the extent such
gain is taken into account in computing gross income."
10. The main provision is I.R.C. § 1222, see note 9 supra. I.R.C. § 1223 provides for
"tacked" holding period in the substituted basis situation and a variety of other special
situations discussed in B. BITTKER & L. STONE, supra note ], at 618-19.
11. See B. BIMER & L. STONE, supra note I, at 608-12 (sale or exchange requirement);
id. at 616-19 (holding period requirement).
12. See M. DAVID, supra note 6, at 25; Surrey, supra note 1, at 988.
13. See Chirelstein, supra note 1, at 2-3 (pointing to ambiguity of capital asset notion
in I.R.C. § 1221).
14. See Miller, supra note 1, at 860-78 (distinction between business and investment as
effectuated by Internal Revenue Code of 1939, § 117(a)(l), the antecedent provision to the
current I.R.C. § 1221(1)).
15. A background problem influencing the general interpretation of I.R.C. § 1221 is
the perverse drafting of the statute to treat all property as a "capital asset" except as
provided under § 1221(l)-(6), thus appearing to make the statutory exceptions the only
gain categories to be treated as ordinary income. The effect is almost as if Congress had
wished to create a presumption favoring taxpayers to the detriment of the Treasury, and
the attempt to escape such an inference has colored the judicial efforts at § 1221 inter-
pretation.
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ticularized theories and holdings, three major avenues of theoretical
development can be discerned.'16
First, there is the venerable "substitute for ordinary income" doctrine
of Hort v. Commissioner,'7 later amplified by Commissioner v. P.G.
Lake, Inc.'8 Under this doctrine, ordinary income treatment should
apply to a lump-sum consideration received by the transferor of an
asset when such consideration is merely a substitute for future income;
only disposition of an asset "more substantial than" a right to future
income may qualify for capital gain treatment.19
From an economic standpoint, this distinction makes little sense.20
An economically rational individual should be indifferent between
direct ownership of a productive capital asset and a right to the future
income stream produced by the asset over its future life.21 For this
reason, the market value of the asset should be given by the best present
estimate of the discounted present value of this future income stream,
with the discount factor reflecting the riskiness of the projected re-
16. The three approaches should not be considered as either exclusive or exhaustive.
In concrete situations, hybrid judicial approaches have been extremely common. See, e.g.,
Bisbee-Baldwin Corp. v. Tomlinson, 320 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1963) (combining substitute for
ordinary income approach with Judge Friendly's equitable interest approach to contract
termination payments). See also 1 S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. MCDANIEL & H. AULT, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION 1051 (1972) (cases following Bisbee-Baldwin) [hereinafter cited as SURREY
& WARREN].
17. 313 U.S. 28 (1941). In Hort the taxpayer received $140,000 from a tenant for
cancellation of a lease. The Court held that the sum must be included in the taxpayer's
gross income and was taxable at ordinary income rates.
18. 356 U.S. 260 (1957).
19. The Hort-Lake approach may be expressed in terms of a fruit and tree metaphor,
with the future income constituting the "fruit" and the underlying capital asset being the
"tree." Such a metaphor had in fact been previously entrenched in the early cases govern-
ing tax treatment of income assignments. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930) (Court
will not sanction "arrangement by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from
that on which they grow"), cited in Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 118 (1940) (taxpayer
enjoys fruits of his investment whether he collccts income or disposes of his right to do
so). A summary of these cases is M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 155-78 (1977).
20. See ,V. HEWlr, THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AND ITs APPLICATION TO FEDERAL TAXA-
TION 27-28 (1925) (tree-fruit analysis not compelling in business transactions whcrc
property sold reflects admixture of "fruit" with "tree"); Eustice, Assignment of Income:
Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the P.G. Lake Case, 17 TAX L. REV. 295, 208-11 (1962)
(similar).
21. An economic equivalence between capital stoek and the income stream it produces
was argued by Irving Fisher early in this century:
In our picture, therefore, we observe (I) a stock of instruments existing at an instant
of time, and (2) a stream of services through time, flowing from this stock of wealth.
The stock of wealth is called capital, and its stream of services is called income. The
income is the more important concept of the two, for the capital exists merely for the
sake of the income, and the ownership of the capital has no other significance than
the ownership of possible income from that capital.
I. FISHER, THE NATURE OF CAPITAL AND INCOME 324 (1906) (emphasis added). The modern
point of view is substantially the same, though typically expressed in much more formal
terms, e.g., C. VON WEIZSXCKER, STEADY STATE CAPITAL THEORY (1971).
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turn.22 Accordingly, under this economic calculus most-if not all2 3 -
business assets (including stock) should be excluded from the capital
asset category under Hort, since these assets are "substitutes for ordinary
income" given an appropriate discount factor.24 Unless one is prepared
to rip up large areas of the settled legal landscape, Hort cannot be read
literally, and the doctrine seems little more than a delegation to federal
judges to do justice as they see fit.25
A second theory has crystallized around Corn Products Refining Co.
v. Commissioner,2 6 whose holding has often been summarized as creat-
ing a distinction grounded on "business purpose" versus "investment
purpose." 27 Specifically, such a distinction would partition property
sold or exchanged into two categories for tax purposes: "business
property" disposed of in routine business operations, with gain or loss
22. See, e.g., K. ARROW & M. KuRz, PUBLIC INVESTMENT, THE RATE OF RETURN, AND OP-
TIMAL FISCAL POLICY 10-14 (1970) (foundations of discounting calculus in risk-free case); V.
BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 63-66 (1972)
(allowing for risk).
23. But cf. Searles, Adventures in Condemnation, Aesthetic Considerations and Unusual
Elements of Value, 32 ALA. LAw. 392 (1971) (courts now considering aesthetic values in
condemnatioh cases).
24. In the case of stock-the paradigm "general" capital asset-an accepted form of
financial analysis identifies stock with the prospective stream of future dividends that it
generates over the theoretically infinite future, and predicts share price as depending on
the discounted present value of this stream. See M. FIRTH, THE VALUATION OF SHARES AND
THE EFFICIENT-MARKETS THEORY 14-16 (1977); W. LEWELLEN, THE COST OF CAPITAL 88-93
(1969). A related valuation model would relate present share value directly to projected
future corporate earnings rather than to dividends paid, see M. FIRTH, supra at 22-23. Of
course, it has long been recognized that such "intrinsic value" models are overly simplistic
in many cases, and may in particular do violence to market psychology in both bull and
bear periods.
25. See Miller, Capital Gains Taxation of the Fruits of Personal Effort: Before and
Under the 1954 Code, 64 YALE L.J. 1, 21-22 (1954) (reviewing efforts by lower courts to
place limits on Hort for exactly this reason). Ultimately, the Hort doctrine derives from
general judicial vigilance against the panoply of clever tax-avoidance schemes. See Chirel-
stein, Learned Hand's Contribution to the Law of Tax Avoidance, 77 YALE L.J. 440, 440-
441 (1968). See also Brodsky, Planning Business Transactions to Produce Capital Gains, 7
N.Y.U. TAX INST. 302, 319 (1949) ("If [the Hort] attitude should gain ground in the courts,
it would be a mere matter of time before any scheme or device to convert ordinary in-
come into capital gain would be doomed.")
26. 350 U.S. 46 (1955). The taxpayer in Corn Products, a manufacturer of goods made
from grain corn, purchased corn futures, i.e., contracts to purchase a fixed amount of
corn at a future date for a fixed price. The taxpayer disposed of the futures, and the
Court held ordinary income rates applicable, because the transactions were found to be
"in the ordinary course of business."
27. The usual, expansive reading of Corn Products is typifieq by Booth Newspapers,
Inc. v. United States, 303 F.2d 916, 920 (Ct. Cl. 1962). For other developments of this ex-
pansive reading, see Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. United States, 443 F.2d 1115 (5th
Cir. 1971) (purchase of stock and loans to new company to obtain services of certain in-
dividuals); Steadman v. Commissioner, 424 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
869 (1970) (advance of funds to corporation by attorney to protect his position as its
secretary and general counsel); International Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 62 T.C. 232
(1974), rev'd, 524 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1975) (Corn Products application to gain on sale of
pound-sterling short-sale contract, used to hedge investment in British subsidiary).
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on the disposition to be accorded ordinary income or ordinary loss
treatment, and "investment property" held outside the daily course of
business, with gain or loss to be treated as long-term capital gain or
loss (if the "sale or exchange" and holding period requirements are
met). Identical physical assets may thus be taxed in different ways de-
pending on their relationship to the transferor's business operations.28
The fundamental difficulty with the Corn Products approach is that
the postulated distinction has little independent meaning except as an
artificial tax concept. 29 Most businessmen would be puzzled by an at-
tempt to split their transactions into nonoverlapping "business" and
"investment" categories: most sound business decisions cover multiple
objectives. 30 Once multiple purposes are recognized, the mare's nest of
finding a "dominant" motive is stirred up, as well as the problem of
assigning weight to "substantial" motives found not to be dominant.31
Difficulties like these have caused even the most scholarly of com-
mentators to remark that the field has come to resemble "tales from
Mother Goose." 32
An additional administrative problem produced by Corn Products
is traceable to the taxpayer's advantage over the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) in access to information. When a taxpayer reports gain
on the disposition of what is normally a capital asset, such as stock or
securities, the Service cannot attack capital gains treatment without
detailed knowledge of the taxpayer's business history and plans. The
highly aggregated capital gains reporting schedule33 normally yields
little foundation for such an attack, so that the Service can rarely em-
28. See examples developed in Cunnane, Acquiring Capital Assets for Noncapital
Purposes, or When Is a Capital Asset Not a Capital Asset?, 29 N.Y.U. TAX INST. 705 (1971);
Javaras, Corporate Capital Gains and Losses-The Corn Products Doctrine, 52 TAXES 770,
771 (1974); Troxell & Noall, Judicial Erosion of the Concept of Securities as Capital
Assets, 19 TAx L. REV. 185 (1964).
29. The inherent artificiality of any "business" versus "investment" distinction was
early demonstrated by Miller, supra note 1, at 860-78.
30. See A. CHANDLER, STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF THE IN-
DUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 383-96 (1962); M. ZELENY, MULTIPLE CRITERIA DECISION MAKING, KYOTO
1975 (1976) (Springer Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems No. 123).
31. In the closely related I.R.C. § 1221(l) area, the leading "dual purpose" case is
Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569 (1966), discussed in 1 SURREY & IWARREN, supra note 16, at
1013-16. See Bernstein, "Primarily for Sale": A Semantic Snare, 20 STAN. L. REv. 1093
(1969) (criticizing whole area and developing notion of "undecided purpose"). See also
M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 19, at 269 (emphasis on taxpayer's "motive" has led to much
uncertainty). A further illustration of the horrors of "purpose" as a tax concept is United
States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93 (1972) (disallowing bad debt deduction because debt found
to be more closely linked to individual's "role" as shareholder than to "role" as corporate
employee).
32. Miller, supra note 1, at 877.
33. For a reproduction of Internal Revenue Service Form 1040, Schedule D, with an-
notations, see M. DAVID, supra note 6, at 237-39.
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ploy Corn Products to increase revenue.34 By contrast, in the loss situa-
tion the doctrine is a taxpayer's weapon. Knowing his own finances in
full detail, the taxpayer may be able to convert a capital loss into a
fully deductible ordinary loss by theorizing that the loss was incurred as
part of the conduct of some routine business operation. 35
A third capital asset theory, which has seen application principally
in contract termination cases, 36 would predicate capital asset status on
the nature of the transferor's property interest in the asset relinquished.
Under this doctrine, developed by Judge Friendly,3 7 if the party giving
up a contract right possesses a contract interest that would have been
enforceable in a traditional court of equity, the right is then "sub-
stantial" and deserving of capital gains treatment on disposition.38 If,
however, the party possesses an interest enforceable only at law, the
right is "naked" or "insubstantial" and the disposition produces or-
dinary income. 39
The distinction runs afoul of any economic justification of favored
capital gains treatment.40 Distinctions based on subtleties of legal
ownership have at most a weak and erratic effect on economic behavior
by businessmen. Indeed, since at least the time of Charles Dickens'
fictional Jarndyce v. Jarndyce,41 the shadings and gradations of owner-
34. See M. CHIRtELSTEIN, supra note 19, at 270-71.
35. See note 27 supra (cases illustrating Corn Products application in loss situations).
36. See Note, The Troubled Distinction between Capital Gains and Ordinary Income,
73 YALE L.J. 693, 707-10 (1964).
37. See Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1962) (Friendly's original state-
ment); Sirbo Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner, 476 F.2d 981 (2d Cir. 1973) (later amplifica-
tion in situation where original contract was being modified, not terminated).
38. Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125, 133-34 (2d Cir. 1962). The notion of linking
capital asset status to a "more substantial property right" seems to have initially arisen in
Commissioner v. McCue Bros. & Drummond, Inc., 210 F.2d 752, 753 (2d Cir. 1954). The
Friendly equitable interest approach has understandably attracted widespread interest.
For early responses to Ferrer, see Eustice, Contract Rights, Capital Gain, and Assignment of
Income-the Ferrer Case, 20 TAX L. REv. 1 (1964); Freling, Sales of Intangible Business
Assets, 14 TUL. TAX INST. 209, 225-30 (1965). On the complex remand history in Sirbo, see
Note, Capital Gains Treatment of Restoration Payments: Sirbo Holdings, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, 7 CONN. L. REv. 775, 775-91 (1975).
39. Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125, 133-34 (2d Cir. 1962). There is a confused
history attaching to the notion that certain contract interests may be enforced through
equity, as by decree of specific performance, while other contract claims are enforceable
only at common law, by damages for breach. Examination of the early seventeenth-
century British cases casts doubt on whether a clear notion of the limits of equity ever
existed in the early law of contract. See Gray, The Boundaries of the Equitable Function,
20 Am. J. LEGAL HIsT. 192 (1976). In American federal income taxation, the concept of
the "naked" or "mere contract" right was introduced as a basis for denying capital gains
treatment in Commissioner v. Pittston Co., 252 F.2d 344, 348 (2d Cir. 1958), discussed in
B. BITrKER &- L. STONE, supra note 1, at 545-48.
40. See Blum, A Handy Summary of the Capital Gains Arguments, 35 TAXES 247, 253-
60 (1957); pp. 736-40 infra.
41. Cf. C. DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 1-20 (Oxford Univ. Press ed. 1948) (literary portrayal
of utter unintelligibility of various forms of action at common law).
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ship have been notorious for their incomprehensibility. Predicating tax
treatment on such gradations therefore clashes with the basic objective
of an economically rational tax system.42 An additional difficulty with
the law/equity approach is that the "substantial rights" doctrine has no
distinct content as federal law; rather, it depends on rights created
under state law.43 Even though federal tax law may not be completely
freed from state property law concepts, another major dependency
seems undesirable. With such dependency, capital gains treatment will
vary from Delaware to California and thus will compel courts to resolve
dozens of substantive and conflict-of-laws questions about the local law
governing each disputed transaction.44
The drawback shared by all three judicial doctrines is their emphasis
on aspects of the transactions not normally a part of ordinary economic
or business descriptions. Tax law thus is allowed to run on its own
artificial logic, which is unrelated to economic or fiscal policy. In con-
trast to the three doctrines analyzed, this Note will attempt to draw a
capital gains/ordinary income line that is compatible with the economic
capital gains arguments.
II. Economic Rationale for a New Theory
Of the many justifications historically made for favored tax treatment
of capital gains, the only compelling arguments are the economic
ones.45 Specifically, these arguments stem from the public interest in
42. In fact, much of the conceptual apparatus surrounding the law/equity distinction
is dissolving in the light of modern reevaluations of property law from an economic
standpoint. See, e.g., Ackerman, Introduction, in ECONOMic FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW
(B. Ackerman ed. 1975); Demsetz, Towards a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. EcoN. REv.
347 (1967).
43. In principle, of course, a specialized tax doctrine of the law/equity distinction
could be developed, much as existing tax law has developed a concept of earned surplus
called "earnings and profits" to govern the taxation of dividend distributions. But to do
so would create a morass of new law that one would go far to avoid. On the earnings and
profits experience, see Andrews, "Out of Its Earnings and Profits": Some Reflections on
the Taxation of Dividends, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1403 (1956); Zarky & Biblin, The Role of
Earnings and Profits in the Tax Law, 1966 S. CAL. TAX INSr. 145.
44. Cf. Note, Problematic Definitions of Property in Multistate Death Taxation, 90
HARV. L. REv. 1656 (1977) (similar problems arising in connection with state death taxes).
45. The original congressional intent that motivated enactment of the predecessor
sections to I.R.C. § 1221 is very incompletely preserved in the available record, see note 5
supra, and in any event is of doubtful relevance as authority for resolving contemporary
policy problems. Still less germane to that policy are the venerable arguments, traceable
to the period immediately after the Civil War, that attempt to separate capital gains from
the income concept altogether. See Gray v. Darlington, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 63 (1872) (profit
on sale of government bonds found not to be income under language of Internal Revenue
Act of 1867). By now, "income" is a pfurely functional concept that may be accorded as
elastic a scope as necessary to bring virtually any gainful receipt into the scope of fully
taxable income. See, e.g., J. SNEEn, THE CONrIGURPAnONS OF GROSS INCOME 63-68, 121-26
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promoting, and making efficient, investment activities in the private
sector,4 6 together with the recognition that high rates of ordinary in-
come tax may create obstacles to such investment.47 For example, ac-
cording to the traditional tax concept of "lock-in," full taxation of
capital gains at high ordinary income rates may lock appreciated
capital into those projects to which it was committed historically, thus
preventing reallocation of that capital to uses generating higher rates
of return. 48 Although the importance of lock-in has recently been much
debated, its economic significance is widely acknowledged. 49 An econ-
(1967). Finally, the equitable arguments favoring taxation of capital gains at lower rates
are unconvincing in a system where realization is wholly under the taxpayer's control and
capital gains are principally realized in the higher income brackets. See Miller, supra note
5, at 1065-68; Tudor, The Equitable Justification for the Capital Gains Tax, 34 TAXES
643 (1956). See also A. Piaou, A STUDY IN PUBLIC FINANCE 156-64 (3d ed. 1974) (distribu-
tional aspects of taxes on windfalls).
46. For the economic arguments, see Blum, supra note 40, at 256-60; Miller, supra note
5, at 1068-78. Underlying theoretical problems in the economic literature are reviewed by
Shell, Sidrauski & Stiglitz, Capital Gains, Income, and Saving, 36 REV. ECON. STUD. 15
(1969). For empirical studies dealing with investment incentives and behavior, see J.
BUTTERS, L. THOMPSON & L. BOLLINGER, EFFECTS OF TAXATION: INVESTMENTS BY INDIVIDUALS
(1953); Jorgenson & Siebert, An Empirical Evaluation of Alternative Theories of Corporate
Investment, in CURRENT ECONOMErac PRACTICE 155 (K. Brunner ed. 1972).
47. See Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932), discussed in M. CHIRELSTEIN, Supra note
19, at 257-58.
48. The lock-in effect can be derived mathematically. Consider an investor I who
currently holds an investment ("current investment P") that will generate future receipts
having a discounted present value Rp. Producing this income are capital assets with a
current market value Kp. Now consider a fresh investment opportunity ("N"). I's total
return on this new investment depends on the amount of capital he can sink in it. Assume,
for simplicity, that the return is proportional to the amount of capital thus committed.
Then R.v, the present value of the return from the new investment, equals Krv, where K
is the amount of capital investment in the new opportunity and rN. is the present value of
the return per dollar of new investment.
Assuming that I acts to maximize his return, he will shift his capital from Current to
New if
RN > Rp. (1)
Assume that I faces a tax schedule t = t(x) under which t(G) is the average tax rate im-
posed on a realization producing G = K-Bp dollars of gain, where BP is I's basis in the
current investment and it is assumed that Kr > Br (appreciation of capital). Inequality (1)
may then be rewritten
(B5. + G(I - t(G)))rN > K~r5 , (2)
where rp equals return per dollar invested in the current investment. Lock-in will then
always be present, assuming a positive tax schedule, and may be characterized by the
following proposition:
If current fair market value exceeds basis (Kp > Bp), any nonzero tax rate applied to
gain on realization will cause rational investors to refrain from shifting their invest-
ment holding, when they would do so in the absence of taxation, if
1
r 5 > rp> -i-- (B + G(I - t(G)))r. (3)
Equation (3) characterizes the cases where efficient capital allocations will be impaired by
taxation.
49. For studies tending to support the magnitude of lock-in, see Brown, The Locked-in
Problem, in FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR ECONoMic GROWTH AND STABILITY 367 (Joint Comm.
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ometric study by Feldstein and Yitzhaki 50 supports the view that
lock-in has a substantial impact on common stock trading. Using sam-
ple-survey data on portfolio behavior,51 these investigators found that
even current rates of capital gains taxation strongly inhibit decisions to
sell. Thus, an effective capital gains tax rate of fifteen percent reduces
the ratio of sales to portfolio value by nearly fifty percent, and this is
representative of effects present in other tax brackets. 52 Given such
sensitivity to a moderate rate of taxation, far more acute lock-in should
be present if the same stock sales were taxed at ordinary income rates
(seventy percent in the top bracket), and simulation results reported in
the same empirical study support this intuition.53 Although transac-
tions in physical capital may not be as sensitive to tax factors, the Feld-
stein-Yitzhaki results are highly supportive of the importance of lock-in.
Pending further empirical research, tax designers should continue to
assume that lock-in is a major hazard to be avoided.
Lock-in may not be the sole economic effect implicated in the deci-
sion to maintain a favored tax category of long-term capital gains.
54
However, preferring to calibrate the choice of a capital gains standard
on a specific rather than a diffuse rationale, this Note postulates lock-in
as fundamental and presents the capital gains tax design problem as
one of minimization of lock-in subject to the revenue needs of the
on the Economic Report, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955); Brown & Nichols, A Deterrent to
Investment Mobility, 25 FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J. 131 (1969); cf. Waggoner, Eliminating the
Capital Gains Preference: Part I. The Problems of Inflation, Bunching and Lock-in, 48
U. CoLo. L. REV. 313, 315 (1977) (lock-in is problem that must be addressed in considering
structural reforms of existing capital gains system). But see Holt & Shelton, The Implica-
tions of the Capital Gains Tax for Investment Decisions, 16 J. FINANCE 559 (1961); Sprinkel
& West, Effects of Capital Gains Tax on Investment Decisions, 35 J. Bus. 122 (1962). Lock-
in may be as much a psychological as an economic effect, and this may help to explain
why the theoretical economic arguments tend to militate against the importance of lock-in
while the available empirical data tend to support it. See, e.g., Sprinkel & West, supra at
122 n.l. An excellent, neutral overview is the discussion in R. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL 
IN-
COME TAX 198-200 (rev. ed. 1976).
50. See M. Feldstein & S. Yitzhaki, The Effect of the Capital Gains Tax on the Selling
and Switching of Common Stock (Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Discussion
Paper No. 532, Jan. 1977).
51. See D. PROJECTOR & G. WEISS, SURVEY OF FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CONSUMERS
(1966) (description of data on which Feldstein-Yitzhaki study is based).
52. M. Feldstein & S. Yitzhaki, supra note 50, at 13.
53. Id. at 28-30. It should be noted that this finding only measures the impact of taxa-
tion on portfolio turnover and does not attempt to take the next step of quantifying the
social welfare loss ensuing from such reduced turnover. For illustration in a different tax
context of how such a calculation might proceed, see Harberger, Efficiency Effects of
Taxes on Income Front Capital, in EFFEcTS OF CORPORATION INCOME TAX (M. Krzyzaniak
ed. 1966); Shoven, Applying Fixed Point Algorithms to the Analysis of Tax Policies, in
FIXED POINTS: ALGORITHMS AND APPLICATIONS 403 (S. Karamardian ed. 1977).
54. See Note, supra note 36, at 695-701 (useful categorization of different possible
economic concerns).
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Treasury.55 Specifically, this Note proposes the definition of a class of
investments that are particularly sensitive to lock-in and should there-
fore be considered "capital assets" for purposes of favored tax treat-
ment. 0
Favored tax treatment through the capital gains system should focus
on private investors who decide to invest "long," that is, investors who
acquire assets giving gradual financial returns over a long period fol-
lowing acquisition. 57 Long investors are especially vulnerable to lock-
in, since they commit themselves to projects that are vulnerable to
unforeseen changes in circumstances that, absent tax effects, would
dictate abandoning the chosen project and reinvesting in another.58
This economic calculus applies equally to holders of long-term con-
tract rights (such as lessors of oil rights) who are contemplating ac-
ceptance of lump-sum cancellation payments and to owners of long-
life physical assets (such as machine tools) who are considering sale of
those assets. In addition, the anticipation of lock-in can deter current
investment in long-term capital stock of all kinds, for reasons that are
both economic and psychological.5 9 A policy of favoring long investors
55. In economic terms, the capital gains definition problem is now being conceived as
a constrained optimization problem, where the constraint ("revenue need") is the out-
come of a higher-level policy choice, reflecting level of government expenditure and level
of deficit financing. For policy factors surrounding this higher-level choice, see R. Mus-
GRAVE: & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 587-610 (2d ed. 1976). But
see A. WILDAVSKY, THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCEss XVi (2d ed. 1974) (impossibility
of effecting perfect separation between tax policy and expenditure policy).
56. This definition presents a policy goal that would approximate the minimization of
lock-in. To solve the minimization problem rigorously, one should ideally seek a measure
of the welfare loss resulting from each possible configuration of capital gains and ordinary
income taxes. However, formal theory in this area remains in an early stage and in any
case is unable to incorporate the transactions costs inhering in any major departure from
the existing system. See M. Feldstein, The Welfare Cost of Capital Income Taxation (un-
published paper, Dep't of Economics, Harvard University, revised Mar. 1977)); J. Green
& E. Sheshinski, Approximating the Efficiency Gain of Tax Reforms (Harvard Institute of
Economic Research, Discussion Paper No. 516, Nov. 1976).
57. The "long" investment concept here would generalize the notion of the "length"
of an investment used to classify bonds along the liquidity spectrum. See C. NELSON,
THE TERat SUC'rTURE OF INTEREsT RATES (1972); B. Friedman, Substitution and Expecta-
tion Effects on Long-Term Borrowing Behavior and Long-Term Interest Rates (Harvard
Institute of Economic Research, Discussion Paper No. 495, Aug. 1976).
58. One major source of such changed circumstances is, of course, uneven inflation im-
perfectly anticipated by investors. See D. FOLEY & M. SIDRAUSKI, MONETARY AND FIScAL
POLICY IN A GROWING ECONOMY 203-24 (1971). Such inflation is at once a significant source
of changing relative rates of return and also a source of significant asset appreciation
whose spurious nature will not be reflected by the existing tax structure. On inflationary
aspects of lock-in, see Blum, supra note 40, at 255-56; Brinner, Inflation, Deferral, and
the Neutral Taxation of Capital Gains, 26 NAT'L TAX J. 565, 571-73 (1973).
59. On deterrence of investment through "prospective" lock-in, see Note, supra note
36, at 697-98.
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thus responds to the tendency of the Western economies to exhibit
chronic shortages in private investment in long-term capital goods. 60
In defining "capital" investments for a variety of tax purposes,," it
has been traditional to seek the essence of capital in the physical nature
of the asset and in the social relations surrounding it. For example, one
major body of case law predicates capital gains treatment on whether
or not the asset is traceable to the taxpayer's "personal efforts," with
an affirmative answer justifying taxation as ordinary income. 2 This
Note rejects such an approach and instead takes the position that "long"
investments are most appropriately characterized in purely financial
terms. An asset should be identified with the stream of cash or cash-
equivalent gross receipts generated by it over its productive lifetime.
The distinguishing financial characteristic that identifies a capital asset
is the extent to which this stream of receipts is dispersed over time (the
intertemporal "spreading of receipts"). 63 The model of a capital asset
is the piece of productive machinery turning out marketable machine
parts over a ten-year period. The model of the ordinary income asset,
on the other hand, is the inventory item whose sale generates an isolated
cash receipt. Between these extremes is a grey area comprising, for ex-
ample, fast-depreciating equipment.0 4 As these examples indicate,
''capital" is to be defined solely through the prism of financial structure,
without examining the source of the receipts in any way.
60. The classical theoretical prediction of such a long-investment shortfall is, of course,
J. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY 27-31, 248-53
(1936). Within the legal and fiscal policy literature, the capital shortage problem is
analyzed by B. BoswORTH, J. DUESENBERRY & A. CARRON, CAPITAL NEEDS IN THE SEVENTIES
(1975); Jones, The Need for Capital, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 265 (1975). Of course, capital gains
policy is by no means the sole policy through which an investment shortage might be met.
See, e.g., S. SURREY, supra note 6, at 206 (recommending use of investment credit mechanism
as "flexible macroeconomic tool").
61. Outside the capital gains area, another capital definition problem arises in seeking
to achieve a stable demarcation between I.R.C. § 162(a) and I.R.C. § 263 (deductible
business expenditure versus nondeductible capital expenditure).
62. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1221(3). The "common law" of federal income taxation has also
long denied capital gains treatment to payments received for contract termination when
the contract involved personal services rendered by the taxpayer, or performance under
the contract could be traced to such services. See McFall v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 108
(1936); Miller, supra note 25, at 16-19. See also [1977] 4 FED. TAXES (P-H) 32,099.15 (tax
treatment of amount received by employee for cancellation of employment contract); B.
BITrEER & L. STONE, supra note 1, at 550-51 (subsequent developments).
63. See J. HICKS, CAPITAL AND TIME: A NEO-AUSTRIAN THEORY 14-26 (1973) (concept of
"time-profile" of capital asset); Chirelstein, supra note 1, at 27-28 (position of lessor
analogized to position of bondholder); Note, supra note 36, at 714-15 ("continuing stream
of income" as appropriate general standard for capital asset status). The intellectual debt
owed by this Note to the last source is particularly to be acknowledged.
64. See I.R.C. § 167(b). However, one should distinguish the legally allowed rate of
depreciation from true depreciation when fast depreciation is a tax subsidy. For criticisms
directed against this tax subsidy practice, see Samuelson, Tax Deductibility of Economic
Depreciation to Insure Invariant Valuations, 72 J. POLITICAL ECON. 604 (1964), reprinted
in 3 THE COLLECTED SCIENTIFIC PAPERS OF PAUL A. SAMUELSON 571 (R. Merton ed. 1972).
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III. Proposed "Spreading of Receipts" Standard
The new capital asset standard requires a test to determine in specific
cases which investments are "long" and which are not.6O Although the
theoretical rationale furnishes a general way of rethinking the entire
capital gains/ordinary income line, this Note proposes a mechanical,
"brightline" test 66 to cover contract termination problems and clas-
sification problems arising at the boundary of section 1221(1), the
"ordinary course of business" requirement.6 7
It is recommended that the standard should at first be embodied ex-
perimentally in Regulations issued under a new enabling statute
analogous to section 1502 in the consolidated returns areas. 68 Such a
strategy seems preferable to immediate amendment of section 1221
since flexibility is thereby preserved: difficulties with the new standard
may be eliminated through amended Regulations far more readily than
they may be exorcised from the Code itself, and prior embodiment of
new ideas in the Regulations is a recognized route to eventual elevation
to the Code. 9
A. Theoretical Development
The new standard can be explained in three steps: (1) identify the
transferred asset with the income stream it generates; (2) evaluate the
"spreading of receipts" in this stream by a mathematical formula and
characterize the asset as a "capital" asset if this spreading exceeds a
65. The mathematical reader is directed at once to note 81 infra for statement of the
proposed mathematical rule.
66. A brightline standard is any clear rule that yields a predictable, definite legal result
when presented with adequate factual data.
67. See pp. 729-30 supra.
68. Modifying the language of I.R.C. § 1502 to fit the present situation, the text of a
possible enabling provision could be:
SECTiON 1221A. REGULATIONS.
The Secretary or his delegate shall prescribe such regulations as he may deem neces-
sary in order to clarify the application of section 1221 in delineating the scope of the
capital gains preference.
Such a statute seems necessary to give the proposed Regulation, see Appendix infra, a
proper authority when its application may lead to results inconsistent with Supreme Court
opinions such as Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941).
69. The utility of well-designed Regulations is not to be underestimated. The so-called
Clifford Regulations, Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(a)-21, T.D. 5488 (1945), largely settled the
potentially endless issues surrounding choice of taxable person in grantor trusts that had
been presented as a sequel to Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940). See Surrey, The
Supreme Court and the Federal Income Tax: Some Implications of the Recent Decisions,
35 ILL. L. REV. 779, 807-13 (1941). Nine years elapsed before statutory resolution was
ultimately provided by I.R.C. §§ 671-679. See Eisenstein, The Clifford Regulations and
the Heavenly City of Legislative Intention, 2 TAx L. REV. 327 (1946) (favorable to Regu-
lations). See generally Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 HARV. L.
REv. 398 (1941) (potential of properly used tax regulations for reducing tax uncertainty
and litigation).
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specified threshold; (3) accord the capital gains preference to disposi-
tions of assets determined to be capital that also meet the sale or ex-
change and holding period requirements.
1. Identification of Asset with Income Stream
Two segments of the income stream require separate evaluation:70
(1) the historical stream of past receipts attributable to the asset while
in the hands of the present owner; 7' (2) the projected future stream of
receipts, to be calculated as if the asset were continuing in the disposing
owner's hands.7 2 Both streams must be computed or estimated with
respect to some fixed accounting period. A quarterly period will be
used unless otherwise specified.
With respect to both past and future streams, it will often be neces-
sary to assign to the asset73 a proper share of an overall return attribut-
able to some larger constellation of productive assets. 7 4 With respect to
the future stream only, the same uncertainties of projection will arise
70. Mathematically, the complete stream R,R 2 ..... R,, R..1, . . . , RR is obtained
by joining the past (historical) stream R 1 ,R ..... R, to the future (projected) stream
Rn -..... RL, where R, = receipts in accounting period i. Here the disposition occurs in
period n and L is the number of accounting periods in the full lifetime as measured from
the point of acquisition by the disposing owner.
71. Observe that no requirement is imposed that the current owner must trace receipts
accruing to past owners of the asset. Contrast the "tack-on" approach followed under
I.R.C. § 1223 with respect to the holding period in the substituted basis situation, see note
10 supra.
72. The future portion of the stream is to be calculated without allowing for repair or
other replacement investment. Under the approach taken in this Note, inflation would also
not be taken into account, i.e., there would be no attempt to "index" future receipts to
adjust them to the current price level as of period n.
73. In referring to "the" asset, an aggregation problem arises whenever several assets
are disposed of in one transaction. The component assets may be tested separately from
capital asset status under the spreading measure, see pp. 744-45 infra, or may be lumped
together and characterized collectively through application of the spreading measure to
the aggregate stream of receipts. As under existing law, the tax result may vary depending
on which of these two approaches is followed. Compare Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d
125, 131 (2d Cir. 1962) (Judge Friendly's "fractionating" approach to aggregation problem
in contract interests) with Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1945) (Judge
Learned Hand's integrating approach when asset sold was entire business). See also M.
CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 19, at 287-93 (review of competing judicial approaches in this
field).
74. Two related valuation problems should be noted. First, when not all output from
a productive asset (e.g., a machine tool) is immediately saleable owing to lack of effective
demand, the value of the receipts attributed to the asset in a given period should be the
fair market value of output produced, not output actually sold in that period. Such an
approach is consistent with the objective of preventing tax policy from unwittingly abetting
a Keynesian economic contraction. See, e.g., A. LEIJONHUFVUD, ON KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS
AND THE ECONOMICS OF KEYNES 49-109 (1968). Second, transactions not at arms-length con-
stitute an inevitable source of problems as in all valuation situations. See R. PAUL, STUDIES
IN FEDERAL TAXATION 228 (1937). These transactions will require judicial discretion, see
pp. 754-55 infra.
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that trouble Chapter X cases.75 In contrast to Chapter X valuation,
however, no discounting to present value is required, and thus no
choice of capitalization rate (with its attendant uncertainties and in-
stabilities) need be made or defended.78 The uncertainty concerning
the magnitudes of future receipts may also be mitigated by adapting a
throwback rule in the present situation.77
2. Mathematical Evaluation of the Spreading of Receipts
In a contract termination payment or section 1221(1) case, capital
asset status is to be accorded to an asset on disposition if and only if the
dispersion of receipts, calculated mathematically by a formal measure
introduced below, exceeds a fixed threshold imposed by the Regula-
tions.
First, given the stream of past and projected receipts, total receipts
may be computed, as may the proportion of those receipts falling in
any past or future accounting period.78 From these proportions one
first ascertains the average deferral time for a dollar of receipts from
the asset, evaluated by measuring from the time of acquisition of the
asset by the disposing owner.79 Thus, if the owner must wait a single
period for a certain fraction of the receipts, two periods for a second
fraction, three periods for a third fraction, and so on, it is possible to
75. See Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); King, Chapter X
Valuation: Principles and Applications, 42 NATL J. CONF. REF. BANKRUPTCY 108, 110 (1968).
76. V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 22, at 73-77 (problem of valuing small
company undergoing Chapter X reorganization). See also Brennan, An Approach to the
Valuation of Uncertain Income Streams, in CAPITAL MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AND EFFICIENCY
351 (J. Bicksler ed. 1977) (mathematical model attempting to improve reliability in this
situation).
77. See pp. 756-57 infra.
78. In the notation of note 70 supra, total receipts will be
T=R1 +R 2 +. . .+RL
(adding total past stream to total projected future stream). The proportion r, of receipts
falling in period i is represented by r, = R, 1/T. This quantity may also be interpreted as
the probability that a randomly chosen dollar of receipt attributable to the asset will be
realized in period i.
79. Mathematically, this average deferral time M is given by the formula
L
M = ir = r + 2r, + 3r.+... +-Lrz,
L
where the symbol : ir, is to be read "the sum from period I to period L of the quantities
i=I
i multiplied by r," and the r, are as specified in note 78 supra. On the notation, see F.
MOSTELLER, R. ROURKE & G. THOMAS, PROBABILITY WITH STATISTICAL APPLICATIONS 417-26
(1961).
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compute how many periods, on the average, the investor must wait for
a dollar of receipt.8 0
Given this average deferral time, the next step is to measure the
degree of spreading of deferral times around the average deferral time.
Mathematically, this problem can be solved by calculating the statistical
standard deviation of the waiting times for dollars of receipts.,' In the
case of an asset such as an inventory item that generates a receipt in
only one accounting period, the standard deviation is zero by defini-
tion, since the "stream" is then as tightly bunched as possible.8 2 On
80. Mathematically, M in note 79 supra may be rewritten
LM= iR,)/T,
i~l
where T = total receipts.
81. The formula for the standard deviation (S.D.), which is the central formula of this
Note, is
S.D. i- (1 + r-(2 - M2 +... + rL(L - AM).
See W. FELLER, INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY THEORY AND ITS APPLICATIONS 213 (2d ed.
1957). The mathematical motivation for this formula may be summarized through the
following steps:
I. A measure is sought to describe how widely the deferral times are spread around
the average deferral time (M).
2. The initial naive idea is to add up the deviations from M as the chosen measure of
spreading or dispersion. However, this yields zero because the negative deviations
L
can be shown always to cancel exactly out the positive ones, i.e., Y ri(i - M) = 0 (this
i= 1
is a corollary of how M is defined).
3. To get rid of negative quantities in the sum, square (i - M) in each term in the sum,
exploiting the fact that the square of any number is positive. Thus obtain
L
4. This formula will always yield a satisfactorily positive result. However, since we
have squared a quantity having the dimensions of [TIME], the formula yields a
number having the dimensions of [TIME]2 , and so (in a spatial analogy) is analo-
gous to [AREA] rather than to [LENGTH]. To convert back into units comparable
with M (whose dimensions are those of [TIME]), take the square root, yielding the
formula shown.
This fourth step is not required for the particular use to which the S.D. is put in de-
fining "capital asset." Specifically, S.D.> c if and only if (S.D.)2->e 2, where c is the
threshold cutoff of p. 745 infra, so that the present capital asset standard could be
stated without taking a square root. However, this slight gain in computational simplicity
is outweighed by the lesser interpretability of a standard that proceeds in terms of quanti-
ties with dimensions [TIME]2, not [TIME]. For numerical illustration of how S.D. is
computed, see notes 95 & 102 infra.
82. Formally: r, is zero for i k, so that all terms in the summation within the S.D.
formula are zero except possibly for the kth term. But note that k = A = average deferral
time, see note 79 supra, so that the kth term = rk(k - Al) 2 = 0, whence all terms in the S.D.
summation are zero and the statement in the text follows. This works neatly only if one
adopts a vantage point in time after the'asset has been sold (as contrasted with an ex ante
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the other hand, where receipts are obtained uniformly across the life
of the asset, as under a contract stipulating fixed rental payments, the
standard deviation is positive and increases in direct proportion to the
lifetime of the asset.83
A reasonable 4 "cutoff point," at which the spreading is large enough
to qualify the asset for capital asset status, is 1.5 years (six quarters).
Such a point would accord capital asset status to all uniform streams
having duration longer than 5.2 years, and ordinary income status to
shorter uniform streams.8 5 Although any such choice of cutoff is no less
arbitrary than many other dividing points in the Code,86 the cutoff
viewpoint where there is a positive expected receipt in each future period, depending on
the estimated sale probability in that period). To clear up any ambiguity, one may simply
follow the familiar tax expedient of adopting the point of view less favorable to the
aspiring taxpayer. In the present situation, this will always be the ex post calculation
yielding a zero S.D., as opposed to the ex ante calculation yielding a positive S.D.
83. Specifically, when receipts are uniformly realized over both past and future life-









which may be proved by mathematical induction. Substituting M = (L + 1)/2 in the S.D.
expression obtained and simplifying, the S.D. is shown to be
S.29L for large L
S.D. -_ '
and is thus very nearly proportional to the lifetime with an error of less than one percent
for L > 10.
84. Alternatively, one might use the S.D. measure as the basis for a sliding scale of tax
rates, with the extent of favored treatment increasing as a continuous function of the
spreading of receipts. The approach in the text is recommended largely for its con-
formability to the existing structure of capital gains treatment, and the sliding scale ap-
proach merits further exploration.
An alternative strategy to selecting the cutoff would focus on conservation of revenue,
and choose its value so as most nearly to match total (capital gains and ordinary income)
revenue to that collected under the existing law.
85. This result may be derived, employing the formula of note 83 supra with a




L2 1  = 6 (quarters),
whence L 2 = (36 X 12) + I = 433, L = 20.8 quarters or 5.2 years. Longer uniform streams
will exceed the imposed cutoff, shorter ones will fall short of it.
86. E.g., I.R.C. § 368(c) (80% control test); B. Br TrFR 9- J. EusricE, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 3-29 (3d ed. 1971) (favoring clarity of 80%
control test of I.R.C. § 368(c)).
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proposed is consistent with the notion that sixty months (five years) is
a "short" life for purposes of the fast amortization provisions of the
Code,87 and that ten years is a "long" period for reversionary interest
purposes in the Clifford area88 and various other Code provisions.80
3. Remaining Requirements Taken from Current Law
In a contract termination payment or section 1221(1) case, long-term
capital gain status is then to be accorded to gain on any disposition of
a capital asset, as defined by applying the spreading of receipts criterion,
where (1) the one-year holding period requirement of sections 1222
and 1223 is satisfied and (2) the sale or exchange requirement under
section 1222 is also met.
Retention of the existing law's holding period requirement results
from the uncertainties of prospectively valuing the future stream of
receipts.90 Because the proposed capital asset standard depends in part
on such valuation, the holding period assumes a stabilizing purpose, for
it guarantees that at least four quarters of the stream will consist of data
rather than projections.
The evolution of the sale or exchange doctrine has seen the law
moving slowly toward a "spreading of receipts" idea that complements
the present proposal. Specifically, if the sale or exchange doctrine is
applied to bar the capital gains preference when consideration is spread
out in time, as in the "bootstrap acquisition" pledge of a part of the
future income of an acquired business, 9' the doctrine may operate as a
converse to the proposed capital asset test: capital gains treatment is to
be denied if either the receipts attributable to the asset are heavily
bunched in time (violation of the capital asset norm) or the considera-
87. E.g., I.R.C. § 167(k) (60-month straightline depreciation of expenditures to re-
habilitate low income rental housing); id. § 169 (60-month amortization of pollution con-
trol facilities); id. § 184 (60-month amortization of certain qualified railroad rolling stock).
See also B. BIrKER & L. STONE, supra note I, at 325 (discussing other, analogous sections).
88. See I.R.C. § 673(a) (10-year limit beyond which provision for reversion to grantor
will not trigger tax liability to grantor).
89. E.g., I.R.C. § 302(c)(2) (10-year rule for determining termination of interest under
I.R.C. § 302(b)(3)).
90. Cf. McClung, The Distribution of Capital Gain on Corporate Shares by Holding
Time, 48 Rv. EcoN. & STATISTICS 40 (1966) (optimal holding period length is empirical
queston; need for data on question).
91. Compare Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965) (capital gains characterization
in bootstrap acquisitions, i.e., acquisitions of one business by another where all or part
of the consideration is pledge of part of future earnings stream of acquired business) with
I.R.C. § 514 (reversing Brown in part) (denying capital gains treatment on a formerly
important class of charitable bootstraps); Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. at 581 (Gold-
berg, J., dissenting) (criticizing Brown) and M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 19, at 294-95
(similar). But see Hall, The Clay Brown Case and Related Problems, 1966 S. CAL. TAX
INST. 337 (highly sympathetic view of opinion by counsel for taxpayer who won case).
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tion received on disposition is widely dispersed in time (violation of
the sale or exchange norm).92 In general, the existing law on the sale or
exchange requirement is very complex and this Note merely in-
corporates it by reference.93
B. Application of the New Test to Leading Cases
Examples taken from leading cases construing the capital gains def-
inition illustrate the new capital asset test. All examples apply the
spreading of receipts test using the 1.5 year (six quarter) cutoff previ-
ously recommended.
Example 1: Payment for cancellation of fixed-rental lease contract.
Following the basic facts of Hort,94 assume that the asset being dis-
posed of (by cancellation of contract for lump-sum consideration) is a
fixed-term building lease. The lease contract provides an annual rental
of $25,000 and covers the years 1932-1947, with cancellation occurring
in 1933.
Application of the spreading of receipts formula to a stream of uni-
form rental payments lasting sixty quarters yields a standard deviation
value of 4.32 years. 90 Since 4.32 years exceeds the threshold of 1.5
years, the contract right to receive rental payments is a capital asset
under the formula.90 Capital gains treatment should thus apply to
92. For a similar statement of what the sale or exchange doctrine should accomplish,
see M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 19, at 295.
93. For a partially dated review of the law, see Note, supra note 36, at 701-04. As with
so much law in the capital gains field, the roots of the sale or exchange doctrine are in
unrelated areas of taxation, notably the "open transactions" doctrine of Burnet v. Logan,
283 U.S. 404 (1931) (no current tax liability where asset received is found to be incapable
of present valuation). The critics have by and large been no more charitable to the sale
or exchange doctrine than they have been to the capital asset concept. See, e.g., Miller,
supra note I, at 885; Surrey, supra note I, at 1007.
94. Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28, 29 (1941). 60"- 1
95. I.e., using the formula developed in note 83 supra, S.D. = 12 -= 17.3 quar-
ters = 4.32 years. In any case such as this where the stream of receipts is uniform, the ab-
solute magnitude of the receipts obtained in each period does not influence the tax result.
In mathematical terms, this invariance follows from the fact that S.D. is zero-order homo-
geneous as a function of R = (R1, R2 .... RL) (notation following note 70 supra). Many
contract cases will stipulate a uniform receipt, though uniformity cannot of course be ex-
pected in general (which is the reason why the present theory requires the more general
S.D. formula of note 81 supra).
96. Two complications should be noted. First, a peculiarity of the Hort facts involved
finalization in 1927 of the contract governing the 1932-1947 lease. Hort v. Commissioner,
313 U.S. 28, 29 (1941). Thus there appears to be ambiguity as to whether the S.D. measure
should be applied to a 15-year stream, see note 95 supra, or to a 20-year stream (1927-1947)
whose first five years produced zero receipts to lessor. But the two approaches, although
seemingly different, in fact each lead to the same S.D. of 4.32 years. To see this equiva-
lence mathematically, call the 15-year stream Stream I and the 20-year stream Stream II.
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lessor's receipt of the lump-sum consideration, a result opposite to
that arrived at by the Supreme Court.97
Example 2: Consideration received for caived-out oil payment rights.
In Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc.,9" a corporation engaged in ex-
traction of oil assigned an oil payment right to a third party in con-
sideration of the cancellation of a debt owed by the corporation to the
third party. Consider initially the simplified situation based on the
Lake facts where the debt is 5600,000 and the assigned right gives the
third party the right to receive $200,000 in each of the three years
following assignment. Application of the spreading of receipts formula
to the "asset" transferred, conceived as a three-year stream of $200,000
per year (with a yearly accounting period), yields a standard deviation
of .82 years, less than the 1.5-year cutoff. Thus capital gains treatment
should be denied to the corporation when it receives cancellation of
indebtedness income at the time of the assignment. This result concurs
with that reached by the Supreme Court.
In contrast to the "substitute for ordinary income" doctrine applied
in the actual Lake case,99 however, the present result turns strictly on
the comparatively short-term character of the payment right assigned.
If the assigned right had a cash value of $60,000 per year over the next
For Stream I, M = 30.5 quarters and for Stream II, M = 50.5 quarters, corresponding to a
five-year longer waiting time. The S.D. for Stream I,
60 1 80 1
S.D. j - 30.5)2 = / 21- (i- 50.5)2
The second way of writing the sum is readily seen to coincide with the S.D. of Stream II,
relying on the fact that for this stream, ri = 0 for i = 1, 2. 20 and r, = 1/60 for i =
21, 22,... 80.
Second, the way in which the S.D. formula is applied in the text takes no account of
the motives that may underlie lessor's readiness to accept cancellation. If, for example,
the lessor readily accepts cancellation because of lessee's imminent insolvency, it is reason-
able to discount that part of the rental stream not yet paid to the taxpayer-landlord, and
the spreading of the income stream in the landlord's hands will diminish accordingly. The
taxpayer will therefore argue that cancellation of the lease has not taken place on account
of insolvency concerns, and the Service will be equally ready to argue that this is in fact
the dominant motive. In this situation, which requires a determination of the financial
circumstances of a party (the lessee) not privy to the tax transaction, one is tempted
to reverse the normal evidentiary presumption placing burden of proof on taxpayer in
federal tax transactions. For precedent in doing this under Tax Court Rules, see R.
HOLZMAN, THE TAxPAYER'S PROBLEM OF PROOF 5-6 (1972) (situations where burden may
be on either party depending on the facts); id. at 6-8 (situations where burden is on the
Secretary).
97. Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28, 31 (1941). For a critique of the Hort approach,
see pp. 732-33 supra.
98. 356 U.S. 260 (1958). The statutory background has altered as a result of Lake:
I.R.C. § 636 now requires that most carved-out production payments of the Lake type be
treated as mortgage loans. See Collie & Linden, The Tax Reform Act of 1969 and Domestic
Oil and Gas, 21 Sw. LEGAL FOUNDATION INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAx. 419, 425-32 (1970).
99. 356 U.S. at 265.
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ten years, in consideration for the cancellation of the debt, the effect
would be indiscernible from disposition of any other type of long-term
investment, and capital gains treatment should apply to the corpora-
tion.100
The formula actually used in Lake to govern the terms of the assign-
ment was somewhat more complicated than uniform repayment. Spe-
cifically, the substance of the Lake income assignment was to pay off a
portion of the remaining debt in each year until full repayment had
been achieved, but in no year was the amount repaid to exceed twenty-
five percent of the company's working interest for that year.101 If the
proceeds varied, the yearly repayments would likewise fluctuate in the
same proportion. For example, if the twenty-five percent ceiling per-
mitted repayment of $300,000 in year one (corresponding to $1,200,000
in total receipts from the working interest for that year), $150,000 in
year two (total receipts of $600,000), and $150,000 in year three, the
lifetime of the assignment would still be three years, but the annual
receipts would fluctuate; the standard deviation of waiting times would
now be .83 years (annual accounting period). 0 2 The spreading of
receipts. threshold would still not be met, and there would be no change
in the tax result.
Example 3: Receipts obtained from sale of commodity futures. Fol-
lowing Corn Products,0 3 assume that a taxpayer sells future interests in
commodities that are used as raw materials in the taxpayer's business,
thus attempting to maintain a balanced long-term position in a volatile
supply market. 0 4 Specifically, the Corn Products Company would
normally purchase futures contracts in the fall, take delivery on such
contracts as it found necessary to its manufacturing operations, and
sell the remainder in early summer if no shortage appeared imminent.
In applying the spreading of receipts formula, it is important that
all futures contracts called for delivery in several months. In other
words, they were short-term contracts bought and sold on speculation
100. Indirectly, the economic effect would be to reward the firm for working a long-
term extraction interest. See pp. 738-40 supra (policy discussion).
101. 356 U.S. at 262. It appears that by the time the Lake litigation had reached the
Supreme Court, full repayment had been completed. The terms of the assignment also
provided for three percent interest payments on the outstanding debt principal, which
are ignored for simplicity in the present calculation.
102. Dropping 000s (which are immaterial anyway, see note 95 supra), the stream
is (300, 150, 150), yielding M = M X 1) + ( X 2) + (14 X 3) = 1.75 years, S.D. -
/ (1- 1.75)2 + (2 - 1.75)2 + (3 - 1.75)-- = .83 years (yearly periods of account).
103. Corn Prods. Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
104. On the economic background of transactions of the Corn Products type, see A.
Goss & B. YAMEY, THE ECONOMICS OF Fu-ruREs TIRADING (1976); Houthakker, The Scope and
Limits of Futures Trading, in THE ALLOCATION OF ECONOMic Rasoucas (1959).
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about the yield of the harvest in the year following purchase. 105 Thus,
if the corporation elected to sell, sales of futures bought at a given time
could not have extended over much more than a year, implying a
standard deviation of sales receipts of two quarters at most, much less
than the 1.5-year threshold proposed for capital asset treatment. 106 The
proposed standard would therefore deny capital gains treatment in the
Corn Products fact situation, regardless of the details of the transac-
tions, because it is not possible to make a "long" asset out of a near-
term future.'07 This short-term character is typical of most agricultural
futures, where the contracts involved normally call for delivery in one
year to eighteen months. 08
Example 4: Losses from bankruptcy of a corporate subsidiary. Fol-
lowing the facts of W.W. Windle Co. v. Commissioner,'00 suppose that
a corporation sets up a subsidiary to act as a "captive customer" for its
products and also for possible gain through asset appreciation. After a
number of years of unsuccessful operations, the subsidiary is liqui-
dated. Is the parent's loss on the subsidiary's common stock to be treat-
ed as a capital loss (as would normally be the case on stock losses), or an
ordinary loss deduction under section 165(a) (if the stock is conceived
merely as a proxy for the interest of the parent company in the sub-
sidiary's operating assets)?110
105. 350 U.S. 46, 48-49 (1955). For a more detailed statement of facts, see Corn Prods.
Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 395, 396 (1951) (contracts involved stipulated for
delivery in 11 months or less).
106. For a stream whose length is known it can be shown that the greatest possible
S.D. arises when half the receipts are in the first period and half in the last. For such a
stream, if the length is L,
M=%(L + 1)
S.D. = N/ %(I - %[L + 1])2 + (L-%[L + 1])2 = (L- 1)/2,
so that in the case of a stream lasting L = 4 quarters, the greatest possible S.D. is 1.5
quarters.
107. A different result could ensue in cases where a set of extremely long-term futures
contracts are purchased in a batch and then sold piecemeal over a long period, producing
a long-term stream of receipts and mimicking the spreading of receipts that is the hall-
mark of capital assets under the proposed standard. See Yamey, Short Hedging and Long
Hedging in Futures Markets: Symmetry and Asymmetry, 14 J.L. & EcoN. 413 (1971). A
closely analogous situation is presented by oil in place that is purchased for extraction and
sale. Such a depletable resource is a hybrid between "inventory" and a "capital asset."
See Freeman, Percentage Depletion for Oil-A Policy Issue, 30 IND. L.J. 399, 403 n.l 1 (1955)
(finding greater similarity to inventory).
108. See T. HIERONYMUs, ECONOMICS OF FuTuREs TRADING FOR COMMERCIAL AND PER-
SONAL PROFIT 38 (1971) (futures contracts generally extend forward one year, though silver
futures are typically 15 months); S. KROLL & I. SHISKO, THE COMMODITY FtrruEs MARKET
GUIDE 11 (1973) (commodity futures contracts begin trading with maximum life varying
from nine to eighteen months).
109. 65 T.C. 694 (1976), appeal dismissed, 550 F.2d 43 (Ist Cir. 1977).
110. Applying Corn Products, the Tax Court held for the Commissioner "on the
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To apply the spreading of receipts formula in this type of case, it
seems most realistic to examine directly the dispersion of the sub-
sidiary's earnings stream, or (when the parent is not a full owner) the
dispersion of that part of the subsidiary's earnings that are attributable
to the parent on a pro rata basis through stock ownership.111 In the case
of the Windle subsidiary, which was seventy-two percent owned by its
parent-taxpayer, 1 2 the eight years of operating life from 1962 through
1969 showed only two years (1965 and 1966) with a positive profit.1
Hence the appropriate stream whose spreading is to be computed is a
stream consisting of thirty-two quarters, eight of which are presump-
tively positive and the remainder of which are zero."14 Assuming that
the profits were realized evenly across the four quarters in the two tax
years showing a balance-sheet profit, the standard deviation is .57 years,
falling short of the 1.5 year threshold and indicating ordinary loss treat-
ment. If comparable profit levels had also been realized in 1963-64 and
1967-68, however, sufficient spreading would have been present to hold
the taxpayer to capital loss on the stock (standard deviation of 1.73
years). In the situation where no profits at all are realized, creating a
zero profit stream, capital loss treatment should apply, since the spread-
ing measure is then not mathematically defined and hence gives no
reason to depart from the conventional position that stock is a capital
asset11,5
ground that, while petitioner's principal motive was to acquire a captive customer, it
had a substantial subsidiary investment motive, which prevented it from being entitled to
an ordinary loss." Id. at 704 (emphasis added). Just how the taxpayer could have shown
that its "investment" motive was insubstantial is far from clear.
111. If, for example, there is an 80% ownership interest over all periods, the stream
to which S.D. is to be applied is .SRI, .8R, ..... 8RL, where R, = income of the con-
trolled corporation in period i. Observe that this gives the same S.D. as in the case of
100%, ownership, since the S.D. does not depend on the absolute magnitude of the stream,
see note 95 supra. Thus the only way in which S.D. could be affected by the ownership
proportion is if this proportion varies over the history of the stream, in which case the
S.D. is applied to the stream (fIX RI), (f.X R),. (fLX RL) where f, is the ownership
proportion applicable to period i.
112. 65 T.C. at 696.
113. Id. at 698.
114. This assumes, of course, that profits are realized uniformly across quarters within
each tax year.
115. Specifically, one has T = 0, whence ri = 0/0 and is arithmetically undefined in all
quarters. Thus the S.D. measure, which is defined using the r, in the formula of note 81
supra, does not exist mathematically in this case.
It is easy to see that S.D. will be undefined only in this case of a strictly zero income
stream, since in r, = R,/T the denominator (T) is zero only when there are no receipts
in any period. If total receipts are very small, the S.D. measure, although no longer
mathematically undefined, will be highly sensitive to small errors in measurement and
disagreements concerning valuation. However, for most practical applications where sums
are sufficiently substantial to be litigated, this type of difficulty will not arise.
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IV. Advantages of the Spreading of Receipts Standard
The proposed mechanical standard should yield advantages over cur-
rent law. Conceptually, the formula yields a coherent, consistent rule
justifiable by reference to a leading economic rationale for the capital
gains preference. Practically, the formula should be workable and,
moreover, will facilitate planning and reduce litigation in a confused
area of tax law.
A. Economic Justification of the New Standard
Insofar as the encouragement of long-term investments may be taken
as the direct objective of the capital gains system, 1 " the spreading of
receipts test is an appropriate and consistent legal vehicle for im-
plementation of that policy. There is no uniquely correct means of
defining the concept of "economic life," but the approach developed
through the spreading of receipts formula is supported both by statis-
tical tradition 17 and by the results it yields in the cases examined.'"
The simpler measure of economic "life," namely average time to
realization of returns, 1 9 is in fact not in keeping with the economic
policies motivating capital gains treatment. Specifically, defining a
"capital asset" as an asset for which the average deferral time for re-
ceipts exceeds some specified cutoff would encourage holding potential-
ly productive assets idle in the hope of windfall gain.120 Indeed, were
such a standard to be adopted rather than the present one, any asset
116. See pp. 738-40 supra.
117. See, e.g., I M. KENDALL & A. STUART, THE ADVANCED THEORY OF STATISTICS 41-54
(3d ed. 1969). But see Boorman & Arabie, Structural Measures and the Method of Sorting,
in 1 MULTIDIMENSIONAL SCALING: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
225 (R. Shepard, A. Romney & S. Nerlove eds. 1972) (alternative formulas derived from
lattice theory); Hopewell & Kaufman, Bond Price Volatility and Term to Maturity: A
Generalized Respecification, 63 Am. EcON. REV. 749 (1973) (alternative financial length
measure, "duration," applied to analysis of bond prices).
118. A brief tabular summary may be useful here:
SPREADING OF
CASE RECEIPTS TEST HISTORICAL OUTCOME
Ex. 1. Hort KG 01
Ex. 2. Lake 01 01
Ex. 3. Corn Products 0I 0I
Ex. 4. Windle OL KL
Here KG = capital gain, KL = capital loss, O = ordinary income, OL = ordinary loss.
119. See pp. 743-44 supra. Mathematically, this average deferral time is M in note 79
supra. In the case where there is only one receipt, Af is just the waiting time to realiza-
tion of this single receipt.
120. From a macroeconomic standpoint, the effect of using M, rather than S.D., as the
basis for a capital asset standard would be the systematic encouragement of excess capacity.
See, e.g., Kaldor, The Theory of Excess Capacity, 2 EcONOMCA (n.s.) 33 (1935). The
economic undesirability of such encouragement has been recognized since the time of
Keynes.
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could in principle be converted to a "capital asset" merely by holding
it long enough. Following through the abstract logic, capital gains treat-
ment would not only be justified for the amateur land speculator-long
the bete noire of Code critics121-but also to inventory or inventory-like
items merely because those items were particularly slow in turning over.
A second major aspect of the proposed standard may also be justified
by economic considerations. That is, the relevant "length" of an invest-
ment must be evaluated from the viewpoint of the seller, who pays the
taxes on the sale and who is the "long investor" that ordinary income
treatment would lock-in. There are two natural points at which to
commence the income stream that is to be entered into the spreading
formula: (1) the time at which the asset first entered the seller's hands;
(2) the time of the sale now being taxed (so that "length" is now a guess
as to the expected future lifetime measured from the time of sale). In
rejecting the second alternative and embracing the first, the proposed
test is responsive to the potential deterrent effects of anticipated lock-in
as well as to lock-in itself.'2 2 Moreover, choice of the second alternative
would have untoward effects. Specifically, under this alternative there
would exist a point during a tenure of ownership at which a "capital
asset" would be abruptly transformed into one whose disposition gen-
erates ordinary income, since the future life would have become too
short to sustain the degree of spreading necessary for capital asset
status.' 23 This "switch over" would create an unwarranted tax incentive
for owners to dispose of assets in the middle of their productive life-
times. The first alternative does not in general imply such a "switch"
and thus provides a better basis for defining the stream of receipts. 24
B. Practical Aspects of the New Standard
The present theory should be seen as extending the tradition of
mechanical standards that is already well-established in other Code
121. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 1, at 843 ("Much criticism has been directed against
the resultant paradox that a man's 'sideline' speculations are taxed more leniently than
the income from his principal occupation.")
122. But cf. ALI, DRAFT OF A STUDY OF DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS IN CAPITAL GAIN TAXA-
T7ON 26 (960) (proposing that residual areas of capital asset definition be governed by
denying capital gains treatment to "limited duration assets," i.e., those that will not have
substantial value for more than fixed number of years following taxable transaction).
123. Of course, any holding period creates a similarly arbitrary transition in the op-
posite direction, making the taxpayer suddenly eligible for long-term capital gains pref-
erence when the holding period is met. However, as stated previously, see p. 746 supra,
retention of the holding period is justified for stability reasons.
124. Purists may note that the formally correct way of defining this stream would
be to seek to recreate the prospective stream of returns to the asset as that stream would
have appeared at the point when the asset now being sold was first acquired. However,
since the historical stream R 1 , R2 . . . R,, is the best proxy for this expectation in most
cases, such a retroactive projection seems a needless attempt at precision.
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areas. The advantages of mechanical, brightline tests are well known:
they tend to be uniform in application, yielding a high degree of con-
sistency across cases and courts (and thereby reducing litigation), and
often allow the spotting of naive avoidance attempts more easily than
standards couched in softer terms.125 Mechanical standards also facilitate
legal planning,120 a consideration particularly important in the capital
gains area, where major economic dislocation can result from a success-
ful Service challenge to a claimed capital gain that is largely an illusory
gain because of inflation.127 The main disadvantages of brightline tests
are equally well known: such tests generate inequitable results in in-
dividual cases and may encourage sophisticated avoidance attempts.128
However, it should be possible to limit these disadvantages by re-
strained judicial intervention, principally in the form of a "business
purpose" doctrine that would invalidate contractual devices that create
an artificial spreading of receipts in order to receive capital gains treat-
ment. 2 9 Such a pattern-limited judicial control exerted on a well-
125. On the effectiveness of brightline formulas in cutting off litigation, contrast the
gloomy remarks of Judge Hand on the burgeoning case load that followed in the wake of
Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940), see Kohnstamm v. Pedrick, 153 F.2d 506, 510
(2d Cir. 1945), with the comparatively litigation-free later history of the area once the
Clifford Regulations had been put out by Treasury, see note 69 supra.
126. See H. BIERMAN, DECISION MIAKING AND PLANNING FOR THE CORPORATE TREASURER
(1977) (emphasizing tax planning in rational corporate financing).
127. A useful cautionary illustration as to what may occur when tax distinctions be-
come too diffuse is provided by the recent history of the debt/equity classification issue.
Caplin, The Caloric Count of a Thin Incorporation, 17 N.Y.U. TAX INST. 171 (1959), re-
printed in 43 MARQ. L. REV. 31 (1959), reviews the high-water mark of an attempted
brightline formula approach in this area. Subsequent developments have receded back in
the direction of holistic ("all the circumstances") solutions. So murky have the lines
become that planning has become a nightmare, see Dixon, The Interest-Dividend Syn-
drome: What Are the Criteria Now?, 24 N.Y.U. TAx INsT. 1267 (1966), and commentators
have audibly wondered "whether the realism obtained is worth this price." 2 SuRREY &
WARREN, supra note 16, at 213.
128. A less commonly articulated, though nontrivial, problem with brightline standards
generally is that mechanical formulas, once established at a statutory level in the Internal
Revenue Code, are typically hard to change, except in the direction of still more elaborate
formulas. An example is the elaboration of I.R.C. § 382, providing for a class of special
limitations on net operating loss carryovers, that took place under the Tax Reform Act
of 1976. This viscosity problem is a significant part of the considerations that underpin
the present recommendation to make the new spreading test embodied initially in the
Regulations, rather than the Code itself. See p. 741 supra.
129. There is, however, one part of this problem that mandates statutory resolution.
Specifically, as far as possible taxpayer election of the I.R.C. § 453 installment basis is
concerned, it seems sensible to treat election of this basis as precluding capital gains
treatment of any of the installment payments received, thus blocking any possible double
tax advantage from exercising the election. This provision would reverse the existing law,
which creates no bar to making the capital gain preference fully available to installment
sellers. See M. CHIRELSMIN, supra note 19, at 259, 294. The installment method as imple-
mented in the existing statute is in any case itself a major target for long-overdue reform.
See Ginsburg, Taxing the Sale for Future Payment: A Proposal for Structural Reform, 25
S. CAL. TAx INST. 1 (1975), reprinted in 30 TAX L. REv. 471 (1975).
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developed mechanical underpinning in the Code and Regulations-is
one that has been highly successful (and is becoming increasingly
common) in many Code areas, especially the corporate tax field.130 In
the area of capital asset definition, this pattern should replace the far
broader and vaguer judicial doctrines of the type exemplified by Hort
and Corn Products.'31
Within the general framework of mechanical tests in the Code, the
spreading of receipts formula raises two specific problems. A major
characteristic of the standard is that it involves mathematics. Even in
taxation, lawyers remain uncomfortable with mathematical formulas,
and a significant class of objections to the present proposal therefore
concerns the mathematical complexity of the legal standard it would
create.1 32 In fact, however, numerous current sections of the Code and
130. See Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolu-
tion and Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90, 96 (1977) (review of forces favoring increased use of
mechanical statutory standards in the Code's treatment of corporations and shareholders).
Among the many Subchapter C areas to undergo an apparently successful evolutionary
progression from general judicial rules to statutory mechanizations are: (1) the stock
dividends area, where the principle of Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), found
eventual mechanical expression in I.R.C. § 305; (2) the security bailout area, where the
principle of Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947), was made into a mechanical rule
in I.R.C. §§ 354(a)(2), 356(d); and (3) the preferred stock bailout area, where taxpayer's
victory in Chamberlin v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1953), was reversed by
statute in I.R.C. § 306. Most of these mechanizations retain some slack for exercise of
judicial and administrative discretion, e.g., I.R.C. § 306(b)(4) (exception to ordinary in-
come treatment for "transactions not in avoidance").
131. In some tax areas, mere statutory embodiment of judicial rules has done little to
eliminate vagueness, e.g., the "device" language of I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(B) (governing tax-free
status of divisive reorganizations) embodying the rule of Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S.
465 (1935). Even though the rule in this case has been elevated to statute, little content
has been added and the same kind of judgmental guesswork seems required for applica-
tion. This is paradigmatic of the type of tax statute that the present capital gains standard
seeks to avoid. For a critique of Gregory and its progeny, see Chirelstein, supra note 25, at
442-59.
132. On the general problem of complexity in the tax law, for which this concern
could be phrased as a special instance, see Kingson, The Deep Structure of Taxation:
Dividend Distributions, 85 YALE LJ. 861 (1976); Ginsburg, Letter to the Editors, 86 YALE
L.J. 798 (1977); Kingson, Author's Reply, 86 YALE L.J. 806 (1977); Roberts, Friedman,
Ginsburg, Loothen, Lubrick, Young & Zeitlin, A Report on Complexity and the Income
Tax, 27 TAx L. REv. 325 (1972) (New York State Bar Ass'n, Tax Section, Comm. on Tax
Policy). But see Surrey, supra note I, at 985 ("The fact that our tax law is complex does
not necessarily mean that it is poor law.") A deeper level of objection surrounds possible
conflicts between mathematical procedures and more fundamental values. See Tribe, Trial
by Mathenatics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971)
(conflicts with other values that use of mathematics engenders in conduct of civil and
criminal trials); Finkelstein & Fairley, A Comment on "Trial by Mathematics," 84 HARV.
L. REv. 1801 (1971) (subsequent debate over Tribe's position); Tribe, A Further Critique
of Mathematical Proof, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1810 (1971) (same). The abstract issue in the
background is, of course, the traditional cultural gap between the mathematical culture
and the legal culture. See G. HARDY, A MATHEMATICIAN'S APOLOGY (1940); C. SNow, THE
Two CULTURES: AND A SECOND LOOK (2d ed. 1964). There is an interesting converse to
this cultural issue. If S.D. is indeed the basis for the legal standard that the capital gains
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Regulations invoke at least as much purely arithmetical complexity,
either expressly 13 3 or by implication, 34 as does the proposed capital
gains test. This is especially true in areas on the boundary between law
and actuarial science such as calculations of remainder interests in trusts
for the purposes of estate taxation.' 35 The mathematically distinctive
feature of the present test is that it relies on a statistical standard devia-
tion or variance, whereas most of the established formulas covering
remainder or reversionary interests involve mean values only. 30 How-
ever, the notion of a variance calculation is percolating into tax law
through the growing role of portfolio theory in corporate and securities
law.137 Thus the present proposal should create only a minimal dis-
continuity with current legal ideas.
Second, there should also be a natural concern that mischaracteriza-
tions of capital asset status may occur, in the sense that the actual
spreading of the stream of receipts as the future unfolds may differ
field has long needed, it is not a standard that seems likely to emerge as the outcome of
a long history of judicial accretion. As a result, it is not perhaps surprising that the
common law development of the capital gains definition has been fairly unsuccessful, by
contrast to certain other areas where problems are better suited to common law attack.
See Brown, The Growing "Common Law" of Taxation, 34 S. CAL. L. REV. 235 (1961).
133. E.g., I.R.C. § 341 (massively detailed provision defining "collapsible corporations"
for tax purposes). It is quite interesting that most of the litigation seems to have focused
around the inherently vague criteria of "purpose" with which I.R.C. § 341(a) is rife, not
around the horrendously complex, though mechanical, verbal formula of I.R.C. § 341(e).
See [1977] 4 FED. TAXES (P.H.) ff 17,783-93; Pelletier, Shareholder Intent and Congressional
Purpose in the Collapsible Corporation Morass, 20 TAX L. REV. 699, 730 (1965) (objective
standards of §§ 341(e)-(f) are amendments in reaction to muddiness of "intent" standard).
But see 2 SURREY 8& WARREN, supra note 16, at 553 ("aura of unreality" about § 341(e));
Goldstein, Section 341(d) and (e)-A Journey into Never-Never Land, 10 VILL. L. REv. 215
(1965).
134. See M. DAVID, supra note 6, at 233-36 (mathematical translation of I.R.C. § 1231,
covering property used in taxpayer's business and involuntary conversions). By most
measures of computational complexity, the mathematical formula that is derived for § 1231
treatment is more complex than the S.D. formula of note 81 supra.
135. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-10, T.D. 6296, 23 FED. REG. 4529 (1958), amended
T.D. 7077, 35 FED. REG. 18461 (1970) (valuation rules for annuities, life estates, remainders,
and reversions). See also Treas. Reg. § 20.2013-6, T.D. 6296, 23 FED. REG. 4529 (1958)
(numerical examples of gift tax credit against estate tax).
136. Thus, for example, an actuarial lifetime is mathematically a mean value across
alternative future life trajectories. See N. KEYFITZ, INTRODUCTION TO THE MATHEMATICS OF
POPULATION 24 (1968). But see FED. TAXES EsT. & GIFT (P-H) ff 126,703 (Supplemental In-
structions for Form 706) (July 17, 1974) ("The problems in Part II [relating to interrelated
marital and charitable deductions] must be algebraically expressed with quadratic or
higher order equations .... ") Use of an iterative method of solution is proposed, id at
126,682-M.
137. See V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 22, at 984-1007. The basic two-
parameter (mean, variance) model is due to Markowitz. See H. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO
SELECTION (1959); Rubinstein, A Mean-Variance Synthesis of Corporate Financial Theory, 28
J. FINANCE 167 (1973). In a pattern typical of the intellectual history of the law, legal
acceptance of these developments has been slow: the first major paper of Markowitz,
Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FINANCE 77 (1952), is separated by almost a generation from the
first major legal casebook to cover the mean-variance model in any depth, namely the
Brudney-Chirelstein casebook, published in 1972.
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radically from the projected spreading at a given time. As a -technical
response to this problem, a "throwback rule" principle' 38 may be
introduced to correct inaccurate projections. For example, if a pes-
simistic projection were made at the time of sale of an asset, mandating
ordinary income treatment, in some cases the asset might turn out to
be still in prime working condition years later, retroactively justifying
capital gains on the sale. Then the throwback rule would allow the
selling taxpayer to file for a return of the excess tax payment. By sym-
metry, of course, the taxpayer might be held liable for back taxes if the
mischaracterization went the other way (what appears as a capital asset
on sale is later determined by the Service to have to have the character-
istics of an ordinary income asset).139 Such an adjustment procedure
should be practicable, since it would only be worth pursuing in cases of
highly substantial amounts, where time and trouble are likely to have
been taken originally in order to ensure as accurate a financial projec-
tion as possible. To make the adjustment scheme not excessively open
ended, a definite elapsed time-for example, three years-following
realization should be fixed after which new data would not alter the
original tax characterization.
C. Concluding Appraisal
If a longstanding veil of unnecessary legal complexity can be stripped
away from the area of capital gains classification, a half-century of ex-
pensive litigation can end and the efforts of lawyers and judges can be
directed to more useful pursuits. In seeking to balance the merits of the
present proposal against its possible drawbacks, two summary proposi-
tions may be advanced. First, it is contended that the advantages gained
through the consistency of a brightline approach, notably decreased
litigation and greater facility in planning, outweigh any disadvantages
that may flow from the apparent complexity of the mechanical stan-
dard.140 This judgment takes account both of the failure of existing
138. As provided under I.R.C. §§ 665-669, the general intent of the throwback rules is
as a kind of averaging device for income from accumulation trusts. For an overview of
the current law, which was revised under the Tax Reform Act of 1969, see Committee on
Taxation of Trust Income, The Trust Throwback Rules of the Tax Reform Act, re-
printed in 5 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRusT J. 171 (1970); Stevens, Accumulation Trusts
and the Throwback Rules, 49 TAxEs 876 (1971). See also M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 19, at
179 (use of throwback principle to extend tax credit to beneficiary where income tax
owing has previously been paid by trust).
139. Equity, as well as efficiency in collection, would suggest that the taxpayer who
had initially underpaid should be permitted to pay his outstanding tax over some stipu-
lated grace period in order to prevent a liquidity crisis.
140. The overriding concern motivating this assessment is the heavy litigation load that
has long troubled the capital asset definition field, and particularly the two areas (con-
tract terminations and § 1221(1) borderland) this Note has considered. Quantitative data
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judicial doctrines to resolve disputes in the area and of the general
success of mechanical tests in the evolution of the Code. Second, the
economic benefits of the new standard outweigh any possible tax
avoidance costs. The capital gains category has been devoid of eco-
nomic cogency for far too long. Seeking to achieve such cogency, this
Note has based capital gains preference on a policy of favoring long
investors. With such a clear motivation, it should be much easier for the
Service and the courts to police residual instances of misuse of the
preference, as well as to formulate guidelines for new situations as they
are presented.
APPENDIX: A PROPOSED REGULATION FOR THE SPREADING OF
RECEIPTS STANDARD
The proposed modification would create a new subsection to be added as
Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-l(f.141 It would also be necessary to amend the exist-
ing Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-1(a), second sentence, by adding the italicized
words: "In determining whether property is a 'capital asset,' the period for
which held is immaterial except as this period enters into the formula of
§ 1.1221-1(f) in doubtful cases."
Proposed text for § 1.1221-1(f).142 For contract termination payments
and assets whose classification under section 1221(1) is ambiguous, the
following "spreading of receipts" formula shall be applied to determine
capital asset status. The rule shall be construed strictly against the tax-
payer' 43 in the sense that uncertainties arising in its application, and
particularly from projection of the future segment of receipts, shall be
resolved in the sense least favorable to the taxpayer.(1) In general. (i) To apply the spreading of receipts formula, the gross
receipts attributable to the asset disposed of are first arranged in a stream
of quarterly gross receipts. This stream will in general have two segments: a
bearing out this litigation pressure may be amassed by counting numbers of citations to
each of the leading judicial theories analyzed in Part I supra: Corn Prods. Refining Co. v.
Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955), leads the field with 211 citations in 1955-71 (13.2 cita-
tions per year), see 3 SHEPARD'S UNITED STATES CITATIONS: CASE EDITION SUPPLEMENT 1943-
1971, at 412-13 (5th ed. 1971) [hereinafter U.S. CITATIONS]. By comparison, Hort v. Com-
missioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941), was cited 137 times in 1943-71, an average of 4.8 citations
per year. See U.S. CITATIONS, supra at 916. Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125 (2d Cir.
1962), received 24 citations through 1969, an average of three citations per year. See 3
SHEPARD'S FEDERAL CITATIONS: FEDEaAL REPORTER 520 (6th ed. 1969). In seeking to cut
back on this volume of litigation, as well as to ease planning difficulties in the area, the
Clifford rules are the model that has most directly inspired the present proposal. See
notes 69 & 125 supra (history of Clifford area). See also Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares
in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REv. 297 (1974) (brightline "fairness
formula" proposed to govern the partition of synergistic gain from mergers not at arms-
length).
141. The intent is for the Regulation to be passed under the authority of an enabling
statute such as that suggested in note 68 supra (and modeled on I.R.C. § 1502).
142. Bracketed statements in following text are not part of the text of the Regulation,
but are intended as aids to the reader.
143. This would serve to cover the situations discussed in note 82 supra.
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past segment, starting with the receipts that were attributable to the asset
during the quarter of the first taxable year in which the disposing owner
acquired the asset (hereinafter the "starting quarter"), and a future segment
that projects the fair market value of the receipts that are expected to be
attributable to the asset in each future quarter of its remaining productive
lifetime as of the time of disposition, so that the last receipt in the future
stream is the salvage value of the asset, if any. This projection is to be
carried out in the assumed absence of repair or other replacement invest-
ment.
(ii) Compute total receipts by adding all past and all future receipts de-
termined under (i). Part of this total will thus consist of actual (realized)
receipts and part of future (expected) receipts.
(iii) For each past and future quarter, compute the fraction of the total
receipts attributable to that quarter by dividing the receipts realized, or
projected, for that quarter by the total receipts computed under (ii).
(iv) Multiply each fraction computed in (iii) by the elapsed number of
quarters since the beginning of the starting quarter defined under (i). Thus,
for the starting quarter itself, one obtains the number of dollars received in
that quarter divided by total receipts; for the second quarter, twice the
number of dollars received in that quarter divided by total receipts; for the
third quarter, three times the number of dollars received in that quarter
divided by total receipts, and so on. Add all these quantities, commencing
with the starting quarter and continuing through the last (normally future)
quarter in the projected productive lifetime of the asset. [The result is a
quantity that may be directly interpreted as the average deferral period
associated with dollars of gross receipt attributable to the asset, as measured
in time elapsed from the beginning of the starting quarter.]
(v) Multiply each fraction in (iii) by the square of the difference between
(1) the number of quarters elapsed since the beginning of the starting
quarter and (2) the average deferral period calculated under (iv). [The
resulting quantity will be positive (or zero) in all cases, since the square of
any number, positive or negative, is never negative.] Add the resulting posi-
tive quantities over all quarters in both the past and the future parts of
the stream.
(vi) Take the square root of the sum described in (v). [This is the statis-
tical standard deviation of deferral times associated with the stream of past
and projected future receipts attributable to the asset, and measures the
spreading of receipts attributable to the asset.]
(vii) Assign capital asset status to the asset if and only if the standard
deviation computed in (vi) exceeds six quarters (1.5 years). 4 4
(2) Examples. [Here an actual Regulation would work out at least three
or four examples. Because development of such examples would be lengthy,
the reader is referred to Section III. B supra (applications of the test to
leading cases) and notes 82, 83, 85, 96 & 102 supra (illustrating how the
test is applied arithmetically).]
144. Alternatively, step (vi) could be eliminated, and the quantity obtained at the end
of step (v) directly compared with (1.5)-2.25. See note 81 supra. This modification would
not change the tax result in any case.
